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Engineers of Life?  
A Critical Examination of the Concept of Life in the Debate on Synthetic Biology 
 
Abstract The concept of life plays a crucial role in the debate on synthetic biology. The first 
part of this chapter outlines the controversial debate on the status of the concept of life in 
current science and philosophy. Against this background, synthetic biology and the discourse 
on its scientific and societal consequences is revealed as an exception. Here, the concept of 
life is not only used as buzzword but also discussed theoretically and links the ethical 
aspects with the epistemological prerequisites and the ontological consequences of synthetic 
biology. The second part examines this point of intersection and analyses some of the issues 
which are discussed in terms of the concept of life. The third part turns to the history of the 
concept of life. It offers an examination of scientific and philosophical discourses on life at the 
turn of the 20th century and suggests a surprising result: In the light of this history, synthetic 
biology leads to well-known debates, arguments, notions and questions. But it is concluded 
that the concept of life is too ambiguous and controversial to be useful for capturing the 
actual practice of synthetic biology. In the fourth part I argue that with regard to the ethical 
evaluation of synthetic biology, the ambiguity of the concept of life is not as problematic as 
sometimes held because other challenges are more important. The question whether the 
activity of synthetic biological systems should be conceived as life or not is primarily 
theoretical. 
 
1 The Concept of Life. Its Return in the Debate on Synthetic Biology  
The long and complex history of the concept of life has reached a paradoxical point: On 
the one hand, the term life is used ubiquitously. An array of disciplines under the umbrella 
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term ‘life sciences’ dominate the theoretical discourse of our times. In fields such as 
medicine, pharmacology and agriculture, numerous technological applications are changing 
our daily world. These applications can be understood as an indicator of the far-reaching 
implications that the scientific discourses on life have for society and culture. In the view of 
some, we are living in a “culture of life”, which moves away “from the ideals of the 
Enlightenment towards an idea of individual perfectibility and enhancement” (Knorr Cetina 
2005, p. 76). 
On the other hand, there is no precise and generally valid definition of life. This is not least 
because in current biology the status of the concept of life is controversial. In June 2007 an 
editorial article in the journal Nature claimed: “It would be a service to more than synthetic 
biology if we might now be permitted to dismiss the idea that life is a precise scientific 
concept” (Editorial 2007, p. 1032). Moreover, scientists assure us that “the impossibility of a 
sharp distinction between animate and inanimate would not create difficulties for the biology 
in its everyday scientific practice” (Budisa 2012, p. 101; see also Toepfer 2011, pp. 467-68). 
 Thus, for many scientists the possibility of a precise biological definition of life is not 
important. They regard life as a “fuzzy concept” and are satisfied with the notion that biology 
allows a plurality of approaches to life (see Witt 2012, p. 37). Some scientists, like Dominique 
Homberger, even claim that biologists have an intuitive knowledge of the border between 
inanimate matter and living beings, but are not able to explain the phenomenon of life 
physically (see Homberger 1998). Similarily, the philosopher Jean Gayon thinks that life 
could disappear as a scientific concept and remain only as a “folk concept” for our everyday 
practice. He claims: “When this point will be reached, life will be no longer a concept for the 
natural sciences, but just a convenient word in practice, in the world we inhabit. ‘Life’ will be a 
folk concept. Its specialists will be no longer chemists, biologists, and roboticists; life will be a 
subject for psychology, cognitive science and anthropology.” (Gayon 2010, p. 243). But 
Gayon does not only deny that there can be a scientific definition of life in the strong sense. 
He assumes also that “the recognition of ‘life’ has always been and remains primarily an 
intuitive process, for the scientists as for the layperson. However we should not expect, then, 
to be able to draw a definition from this original experience.” (Gayon 2010, p. 231). Against 
this background, it is not surprising that some critics assert that the concept of life is only 
used as a buzzword to create attention in a world in which the selling of a scientific result is 
as important as the result itself.   
The concept of life has no better a reputation in current philosophy than in science. 
Traditionally, the philosophical concept of life points to a realm which cannot be captured 
completely by thinking. Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the most important philosophers of life, 
claimed around 1890: “The expression ‘life’ formulates what is most familiar and most 
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intimate to everyone, yet at the same time something most obscure indeed totally 
inscrutable. What life is remains an insoluble riddle. All reflection, inquiry, and thought arise 
from this inscrutable [source]” (Dilthey 2010b, p. 72). Dilthey was part of the development of 
a philosophy of life in the 19th century. The term philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie in 
German) groups together highly different authors (e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, 
Georg Simmel, Henri Bergson or Ludwig Klages), who are united more by their impact than 
by their doctrines. Most of them were driven by a critique of the one-sided emphasis on 
reason and rationality in both idealistic philosophy and science. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that there is a tension between systematic philosophy and philosophy of life. Moreover, since 
some philosophers of life were entangled in the theoretical foundation of National Socialism 
(see e.g., Lebovic 2013) – a part of the history of philosophy, which has still to be 
investigated – the philosophy of life tradition largely disappeared after 1945. While there 
have been a few attempts to renew philosophical reflection on life (see Fellmann 1993; 
Worms 2013), the concept of life is mostly used as a critical concept in political philosophy 
(see Agamben 1998; Esposito 2013). There is little systematic work on the concept of life in 
contemporary philosophy. 
Against this background, synthetic biology and the discourse on its scientific and societal 
consequences is clearly an exception. Here, the concept of life is not only used as buzzword 
(a) but also discussed theoretically (b) and plays a crucial role in the debate about the 
ontological, epistemological and ethical dimensions of synthetic biology (c). In what follows, I 
will briefly outline these different aspects of its use1:  
(a) Some protagonists of synthetic biology like Craig Venter consider the ‘creation of life’ 
as the central aim of their research. Moreover, ‘the creation of artificial life’ is advertised as 
“the most sensational success of synthetic biology with the promise to provide solutions to 
our energy, health, environmental and nutritional problems” (Budisa 2012, p. 103). Briefly 
speaking, a lot of hopes and concerns which are connected with the production of synthetic 
biological systems focus on the formula ‘creation of life’. Public press and mass media have 
readily accepted this self-advertisement and have reported on scientific developments in 
synthetic biology from the beginning. Anna Deplazes-Zemp and Nikola Biller-Andorno remark 
correctly that this use of the expression ‘creation of life’ is based on the ambiguity in the 
concept of life: „Headlines such as ‘Life 2.0‘, ‘Engineering life: building a FAB for biology‘ or 
‘Synthetic life‘ illustrate this tendency [that synthetic biology would lead to ‚synthetic life‘; J.S.] 
– such titles would not produce the same effect, if ‘life’ was purely a scientific concept.” 
(Deplazes-Zemp and Biller-Andorno 2012, p. 959)  
                                               
1 For a discussion of life as metaphor in the context of synthetic biology see Falkner, this volume.  
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(b) A lot of scholars – philosophers as well as scientists – in synthetic biology assure us 
that they want to contribute to the basic understanding of life (see Deplazes-Zemp 2012, pp. 
762-763). Due to experimental results like the „synthetic cell” (Gibson et al. 2010) created by 
Craig Venter and his colleagues, debate on the question ‘what is life?’ has reignited. Mark 
Bedau, for instance, emphasizes that „we now have an unprecedented opportunity to learn 
about life. Having complete control over the information in a genome provides a fantastic 
opportunity to probe the remaining secrets of how it works” (Bedau 2010, p. 422). Others, 
like Arthur Caplan, conclude that we have already learnt enough to end an old and for a 
while forgotten debate: 
Venter and his colleagues have shown that the material world can be manipulated to produce 
what we recognize as life. In doing so they bring to an end a debate about the nature of life 
that has lasted thousands of years. Their achievement undermines a fundamental belief about 
the nature of life that is likely to prove as momentous to our view of ourselves and our place in 
Universe as the discoveries of Galileo, Copernicus, Darwin and Einstein. (Caplan 2010, p. 
423) 
Craig Venter claims that his synthetic genomics approach will provide a reductionist 
explanation of life (Cho et al. 1999; Deplazes-Zemp 2012, p. 763). Since, as Michel Morange 
puts it, “life is on the way to being ‘naturalized’”, it thus seems “fully accessible to scientific 
enquiry” (Morange 2010, p. 181).  
As one would expect, these claims have invited objections. Take, for example, Deplazes-
Zemp and Biller-Andorno, who answer directly to Caplan:  
Synthetic biology, even with the production of a living protocell, could not bring an end to this 
debate [about the nature of life; J.S.]. Those who argue that life is more than merely a 
scientific phenomenon would say that a synthetic organism, if it is considered to be alive, also 
has features that cannot be captured by the life sciences. [...] Biocentrists argue that a 
synthetic organism has moral value, and other philosophers claim that a synthetic organism is 
an autonomous system with subjectivity and a self. (Deplazes-Zemp and Biller-Andorno 2012, 
p. 962)  
As these few examples already show, there is a diverse debate2 about the concept of life 
in synthetic biology, which is far away from a precise and universally accepted answer to the 
question ‘what is life?’. 
(c)  The concept of life plays a crucial role in discussions about the societal dimensions of 
synthetic biology. This is because the special ethical relevance of synthetic biology is 
supposed to be explained by the conviction that synthetic biology “entails a confrontation with 
life” (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2013, p. 378). Therefore, some regard the concept of life as 
                                               
2 Further examples include Boldt et al. 2012; Bedau et al. 2010; Dabrock et al. 2011a; Hacker and 
Hecker 2012; Witt 2012. 
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the focal point of the ethical, legal and political questions raised by the development of 
synthetic biology (e.g. Dabrock et al. 2011b, p. 14). The relevance of the concept of life for 
the debate about the societal impact of synthetic biology is closely connected with its other 
meanings. Within the concept of life the ethical aspects are intrinsically linked with the 
epistemological prerequisites and the ontological consequences of synthetic biology.  
In the next section I will examine this point of intersection, and analyse some of the issues 
which are discussed in terms of the concept of life. I will trace some typical arguments in the 
debate on synthetic biology. My analysis is based on the following assumption: If we take the 
idea that there is no precise and generally valid definition of the concept of life seriously, its 
use raises a question rather than a solution, contrary to what is often suggested. 
 
2 Engineers of Life? Current Issues in the Debate on Synthetic Biology  
2.1 Fabrication of Life? The Epistemological Question   
The umbrella term synthetic biology groups together a set of different scientific and 
methodological disciplines, which share a constructive approach to their object (see 
Acevedo-Rocha in this volume; Billerbeck and Panke 2012; Bölker 2011). In this respect, 
synthetic biology can be seen as a new form and development of biotechnology. In contrast 
to other biotechnologies, synthetic biology systematically introduces engineering concepts 
and methodologies like standardization, modularization and hierarchical organisation (see 
Boldt 2013, pp. 391-392; Deplazes-Zemp 2012, p. 772). Moreover, as both practitioners and 
theoreticians of synthetic biology emphasise, synthetic biology research has a creative aim: 
Novel products with useful functions should be designed in a rational manner (see Boldt 
2013, p. 392; Bölker 2011, p. 35-39). In the best case, the human designed biological 
systems cannot be found in nature. 
Briefly speaking, with synthetic biology the engineer enters biology and gets an 
epistemological model of biological research. Since in contrast to other biotechnologies 
synthetic biology is not only the application of theoretical knowledge, the fabrication of 
biological systems should also lead to a better understanding of their composition and 
functioning. The phrase “knowledge through fabrication” (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2013, p. 
377) summarizes the methodological approach of the various forms of synthetic biology (see 
also Köchy 2012a, pp. 160-161). To sum up their attitude, several scientists refer to Richard 
Feynman’s saying: “What I cannot create I do not understand” (see Deplazes-Zemp 2012, p. 
762; Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2013, p. 377; Weiss 2011, p. 17). 
This bon mot condenses a long tradition of modern scientific thinking. Many studies 
mention the prehistory of the epistemological imperative of synthetic biology. It goes back at 
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least to the 17th Century, in which – after 300 years of progress in the production of 
mechanical gadgets and devices – a general scientific research strategy was established in 
the sciences.3 René Descartes and Julien Offray de La Mettrie exemplify a scientific attitude 
which identifies the explanation of a natural phenomenon with a demonstration of how it can 
be generated by the action or activity of a mechanism (see Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2013, p. 
376; see also Deplazes-Zemp 2012, pp. 762-773). Thus, a constructive approach is essential 
for modern scientific thinking. From its early stages theory and practice are entangled. 
Synthetic biology introduces this epistemological principle into a new realm, the realm of 
biology. The ground breaking aim of synthetic biology “is to learn more about the living by 
means of re-construction or fabricating it” (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2013, p. 377). 
In the debate on synthetic biology, it is exactly this combination – the engineering attitude 
and life forms as its objects – which mostly stands for both the potentials and problems of its 
way to gain and apply scientific knowledge. For instance, Deplazes-Zemp argues: 
[…] that the notions of ‘new life-forms’ in synthetic biology, the way that synthetic biologists 
want to contribute to the understanding of life, and how they want to modify life by a rational 
design reveal a conception of life that differs from that of traditional biotechnology. As a result, 
synthetic biology adds a new facet to the multifarious notion of life. For certain ethical positions 
this production- and design-oriented conception of life may raise concerns. (Deplazes-Zemp 
2012, p. 758) 
Further, ethicists like Joachim Boldt completely reject the “conception of life as a toolbox” 
(Deplazes-Zemp 2012). Boldt adopts Hannah Arendt’s distinction between “action” and 
“work” (he calls it “fabrication”)4 and criticises synthetic biology because it is an 
“implementation of the ideals of fabrication in the realm of the living” (Boldt 2013, p. 398). For 
Boldt, the notion of fabricating life encapsulates the problematic assumptions and 
implications of synthetic biology: It reduces life forms to “complex conglomerations governed 
by regularities that apply to physical and chemical matter” (ibid.) and is unable to explain 
their inherent value (ibid. p. 397). I return to this below.  
 
2.2 Living Beings or Artefacts? The Ontological Question  
The criticisms of synthetic biology as ‘fabrication of life’ presuppose that its objects have a 
particular ontological status and deduce ethical consequences from that status: Its objects 
                                               
3 Martin Weiss even argues with reference to Martin Heidegger that the association of knowledge with 
the notion of building characterizes the occidental philosophical tradition since Plato (see Weiss 2011, 
p. 179; this volume).  
4 As Boldt mentions, Arendt originally distinguishes three types of human activity: “labor”, “work” and 
“action”. Boldt drops “labor” with the pragmatic argument that “for the purpose of this article […] 




are regarded as new variants of life and have to be treated as forms of life. But there is a 
philosophical controversy about the ontological status of the products of synthetic biology 
(see, e.g., Gehring 2010, Brenner 2012, Beuttler 2011). This is not least because synthetic 
biology challenges the well-established distinction between nature and technology. The 
ontological relevance of this distinction can be traced back to Aristotle who classifies in his 
Physics “all the things that are” (Aristotle 2004, p. 49) into two forms: He claims that “some 
are by nature” (ibid.) and “others through other causes” (ibid.). Natural objects have the 
“source of motion and rest, either in place, or by growth and shrinkage, or by alteration” 
(ibid.) in themselves. The “other things” are produced and “none of them has in itself the 
source of its making” (ibid.).   
This influential distinction between “physis” and “techne” is still used as a starting point to 
define life: Living beings are identified with natural objects whose definition is extended by, 
for example, the notion of autopoietical organisation (see, e.g., Brenner 2012, pp. 106-8). 
And, they are distinguished from artefacts which are fabricated by human beings and exist 
only in relation to their use. From such a dualistic perspective, a constructive approach to the 
realm of the living seems to be impossible. In fact, philosophers like Andreas Brenner, claim 
that synthetic biology is a misleading concept (see Brenner 2012, p. 118), because living 
beings cannot by definition be produced. Here, the notion of synthetic life is rejected as 
contradictio in adiecto. Since life emerges out of itself, human technology can only produce 
artefacts.  
Such arguments are problematic, because they miss the significance of synthetic biology 
regarding the relation of nature and technology. Kristian Köchy emphasizes that nature and 
technology are closely related, although the well-established distinction suggests an 
opposition. Moreover, he shows convincingly that new technological possibilities change not 
only our concept of technology, but also our concept of nature (see Köchy 2012a, p. 159). 
Synthetic biology is clearly an example for the blurring of the demarcation between nature 
and technology, which can be interpreted in different ways. 
 Some scientists as well as philosophers regard synthetic biology as the ultimate proof of 
a technological understanding of nature and as the closer of the mechanistic world view of 
modern science (see, e.g., Morange 2009; Venter 2013). They put forward a reductionist 
concept of life and claim that the further development of synthetic biology will enable us to 
explain the animate part of nature by constructing it. Michel Morange claims, for example, 
that the “rise of synthetic biology is a return to the ‘old’ traditions: one can claim that a system 
has been fully described only when it has been possible to reconstruct it. […] the 
achievement of the distant goal of constructing an artificial living cell will be the ultimate proof 
that life has been fully explained.” (Morange 2009, p. 52). The notion of constructing life 
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suggests to understand the products of synthetic biology as living machines.5 What qualifies 
the synthetic biological systems as machines is not only their way of production, but also 
their rational design and their function. Anna Deplazes-Zemp remarks: “When synthetic 
biologists speak of their products as machines they imply these entities have lost their 
independence and are thus controllable.” (Deplazes-Zemp 2012, p. 767)  
But it is controversial, if the notion of synthetic biological systems as living machines 
captures the combination of natural and technological properties which you find in the 
existing results.  Products like the “synthetic cell” made by the JCVI or Biobricks – the 
standardised biological parts which are used to engineer novel biological devices and 
systems – present a mixture of natural and technological properties on several levels. 
According to Köchy, in current research natural systems are used as material and models for 
both the products and the production process (see Köchy 2012b, 147-149). 6 Moreover, he 
shows that the technological approaches of synthetic biology are always framed by the 
requirements of complex biological systems (see Köchy 2012a, 165). Köchy defines these 
requirements as the natural prerequisites of the synthetic products and shows that their 
increasing complexity intensifies the mixture of natural and technological modes of 
production (see ibid. 172). Likewise, this complexity sets limits to the possibility of planning 
and controlling the process of production. According to Köchy, in synthetic biology the 
production process has to be conceived as a form of directed self-organisation (see ibid. 171; 
Köchy 2012b, 157). Thus, applying engineering principles in biology causes changes in the 
concept of technology and its relation to nature. These changes also affect the background 
beliefs which coin the self-understanding of synthetic biologists. Some refer to their research 
activity as “tinkering” (see, e.g., Benner et al. 2011), a concept which is in tension to 
essential features of the mechanistic paradigm, especially the idea to design biological 
system “in a rational and systematic way” (European Commission 2005, p. 5). 
Some authors in the debate about the ontological status of the objects of synthetic biology 
claim that their mixed character can only be understood by a hermeneutic concept of life 
which connects nature and culture. From such a perspective, synthetic biology systems are 
life forms, because they are both natural objects and technological products. Here, the 
concept of life should achieve in theory what synthetic biology performs in practice: a 
dialectic of nature and technology. Ulrich Beuttler argues, for example, that on the one hand, 
synthetic biological systems like artificial cells would still be similar to natural life forms, 
                                               
5 For a discussion of the complex history of the analogy between living beings and machines see 
Köchy 2012b, pp. 150-157.  
6 Köchy indicates that the reference to natural systems is also important for the proclaimed future of 
synthetic biology and refers to the report of the NEST High-Level Expert Group for the European 
Commission which claims: “[…] synthetic biology aims to go one step further by building, i.e. 
synthesizing, novel biological systems from scratch using the design principles observed in nature 
[…]” (European Commission 2005, p. 11). 
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insofar as they are constructed as self-maintaining systems, which serve their purpose in an 
independent way (see Beuttler 2011, p. 292). According to Beuttler, reductionist explanations 
cannot capture this form of selfhood. But in contrast to certain autopoietical theories (e.g., 
Brenner 2012) he also emphasizes that the self-reliance of a living being is not based on the 
form of its emergence: “Life moves, preserves, organises and develops itself, but it does not 
create itself.” (Beuttler 2011, p. 297; translated by J.S.) On the other hand, the entities of 
synthetic biology are as technological products part of human culture. As Beuttler 
emphasizes, his concept of life avoids the fatal alternative nature or technology, because it 
encompasses the sphere of culture without blurring all distinctions. He claims that in his 
theory life as culture and life as nature are united and distinguished likewise (see ibid. 300-
301). Regardless of the details and validity of Beuttler’s view, such approaches are 
interesting, because they show that synthetic biology can be interpreted in a non-reductionist 
way and, thus, indicates the limits of a mere biological concept of life.   
 
2.3 The Value of Synthetic Biological Systems? The Ethical Question  
These epistemological and ontological considerations are closely related to ethical 
questions. The assumption that the products of synthetic biology are human-designed life 
forms extends the scope and depth of the relevant ethical considerations. Ethicists, like 
Joachim Boldt, emphasize that the ethical questions which are raised by synthetic biology 
are an inherent part of the research activity, and not just problems of technology assessment 
(see Boldt 2012, pp. 189-190). Here, the definition of the objects of synthetic biology as life 
forms is used to think of this research in terms of interactions between different life forms, i.e. 
human and non-human life. In other words, it adds an existential dimension to the practice of 
synthetic biology. From this perspective, the attitude of the researchers towards their objects 
becomes an important issue (see, e.g., Boldt 2013, pp. 397-400). Others argue that the 
artificial production of living beings is a new challenge regarding our responsibility for nature 
and its future form (see, e.g., Aurenque 2011, pp. 342-344). 
But the concept of life also motivates immediate ethical claims. There are several versions 
of the argument: If synthetic biological systems are life forms, they have to be treated as life 
forms. All these arguments rest on the conviction that life has an inherent value and, thus, 
ethical relevance – a claim, which is intuitively right, but nevertheless controversial (see 
Toepfer 2014). Take, for example, Boldt's criticism of current synthetic biology, which is 
based on an axiological concept of life. He declares self-activity to be the bearer of the 
normative content of the concept of life. This cybernetic concept of life – life as self-activity 
and communicative interaction with an environment (see ibid.) – is combined with the holistic 
potential of the concept of life: The boundaries between the different life forms are sublated 
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(see Boldt 2013, p. 399) and all life forms are conceived as being engaged in seeking a 
common good. The good is a “practical notion of truth” (Boldt 2013, p. 398), because: 
The entity to which one relates is conceived of as taking part in the search for the good in 
which one is immersed oneself. Hence, on this view one does not have an a priori right to 
discard the interests and behavior of the entity, but is supposed to commence action towards it 
in order to get to know the entity and accommodate its interests, if this appears reasonable. 
The inherent value of the entity is a result of conceiving of the entity as a proto-subject. Thus, 
the observer is compelled to respect its ways of behaving and turns from observer into 
companion. (Boldt 2013, p. 397) 
Another claim for the „attitude of respect for nature” (Taylor 1986, p. 59) rests on the 
„biocentric outlook on nature“ (ibid. p. 99). Biocentrists, like Paul Taylor, hold “that all 
organisms are teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unique individual 
pursuing its own good in its own way” (ibid. p. 100). As moral agents, human beings are 
obliged to acknowledge the “inherent worth” of “entities that have a good of their own” (ibid. 
p. 75). Deplazes-Zemp remarks rightly that for biocentrists “the production of synthetic 
organisms would […] imply a moral responsibility towards the produced organism” 
(Deplazes-Zemp 2012, p. 770). Already in 1986, Taylor emphasizes the special relevance of 
an “ethics of the bioculture” which “is concerned with the human treatment of animals and 
plants in artificially created environments that are completely under human control” (Taylor 
1986, p. 53).  He argues that “it becomes a major responsibility of moral agents in this 
domain of ethics to work out a balance between effectiveness in producing human benefits, 
on the one hand, and proper restraint in the control and manipulation of living things, on the 
other” (ibid. pp. 57-58). 
There are profound arguments which can be raised against both the cybernetic and the 
biocentric starting points. Georg Toepfer remarks, for example, that neither differentiates 
between the immanent normativity of every organic life form and the normativity which is 
posited by individual reflection and in distance to the organic presuppositions of life (see 
Toepfer 2014). But the purposes that guarantee the self-preservation of a system are not 
necessarily ethically valuable. There can be a difference between teleological purpose and 
the ethical good. Thus, both the cybernetic and the biocentric position are problematic 
because of their equivocation on the concept of purpose. In addition, they do not provide any 




3 The Concept of Life in Philosophical and Scientific Discourses around 1900. A Key 
Constellation   
I have shown that the concept of life plays a crucial role in current debates on the 
philosophy of synthetic biology. I will now turn to the history of the concept of life. All of the 
issues I have discussed, have a long history in philosophical and scientific reflections on life. 
They are what we might call tropes in the modern discourse on life. The latter starts around 
1800 and culminates in the late 19th century. But in the context of synthetic biology the turn of 
the 20th century is of special interest, because it was around this time that a strictly biological 
belief in the possibility of creating life arose. Scientists like Emil Fischer or Jacques Loeb 
concluded independently that the artificial production of life should be possible (see Budisa 
2012 p. 106). For Fischer – as Nediljko Budisa emphasizes – the chemical synthesis of life 
seemed to be “an achievable goal”: 
Fischer believed that modifications, design and creation of organisms with chemical methods 
is a kind of beginning of a grand future project: he expected new forms of life with 
novel/alternative chemical compositions created by synthetic means to have fundamental 
advantages over the known living organisms with great potentials to gain technological benefit 
for society. (Budisa 2012 p. 107).  
Loeb was also convinced that the artificial production of living beings would be possible in 
the future. In his opinion, only technological problems explained the failure of contemporary 
attempts to synthesize life and he saw no reason why the artificial production of living 
organism should be impossible in principle (see Loeb 2008, p. 258). Loeb’s lecture Das 
Leben (Life), which was delivered in 1911 at the first conference of the monists in Hamburg, 
explained the theoretical framework behind his belief in the possibility of “a practical, useful 
and controlled design of ‘synthetic life’” (Budisa 2012, p. 106). He developed a rigid 
“philosophy of reductionist experimentation that sees living organisms as chemical 
machines” (ibid. p. 106). Moreover, Loeb claimed that if life could be explained completely by 
physics and chemistry, we could also build our social and ethical life on a scientific 
foundation (see Loeb 2008, p. 255). The engineering of natural life would enable us to 
engineer social life as well. His lecture ends with reflections on the natural basis of human 
ethics.  
The social, political and ethical implications of Loeb’s strict naturalism indicate two 
important features of the scientific and philosophical discourses on life around 1900: Firstly, 
the reduction of the social sphere to the scientific method points to the reach of the technical 
imperative of the engineer. Scientists like Loeb or Fischer saw themselves as engineers of 
life. Moreover, as Petra Gehring shows convincingly, the practical orientation of the social 
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sciences led to a technological understanding of society, which would enable its reform in the 
name of life (see Gehring 2009, pp.123, 134).7  
Secondly, Loeb’s integration of the social sphere into his naturalistic concept of life, 
together with the practical direction of his scientific approach, indicates the claim to 
comprehensiveness in the discourses on life around 1900. There were different approaches 
to life, which were connected to one another mainly because of their all-inclusive concept of 
life. Regardless whether the conceptualisation of life was based on nature (e.g., Loeb or 
Ernst Haeckel), culture (e.g., Georg Simmel) or history (e.g., Wilhelm Dilthey) it was 
supposed to comprise the whole of reality. Thus, new epistemological models arose that 
were mainly connected in that they strove to transcend the opposition between the natural 
sciences and the humanities. These methodological claims to comprehensiveness were 
based on the all-inclusiveness of the central concept of life. Its all-inclusiveness provided the 
possibility of undermining the epistemic dichotomy – so it was at least claimed. 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy of life is a surprising example of the attempt to overcome the 
dualism of nature and spirit (Geist in German) within the paradigm of life. From the moment 
life entered the systematic part of his philosophy, a new imperative started to guide his 
philosophy of science, with “life” providing the nexus that brought together all sciences 
without reducing any one science to any other. In particular, his writings from the 1890s show 
that this approach is based on the definition of life as a process of articulation. This idea also 
grounds Dilthey’s attempt to develop a concept of mind out of biological structures.8 The life 
of the spirit is considered as a more subtle and complex embodiment of structural characters, 
which are valid for all processes of life – for instance, thinking is, according to Dilthey, an 
interpolation between stimulus and response (see Dilthey 1981, p. 13). Dilthey posits 
continuity between the different life forms. Moreover, the relation between “higher” and 
“lower” life forms is defined as development, which is characterised by an increasing 
differentiation and delineation. In other words, life in itself develops continually more manifold 
and complex forms. The following passage articulates Dilthey’s aim of grounding structures 
of meaning in biological processes: 
                                               
7 Gehring analyses writings of Arthur Ruppin, Albert Hesse and Wilhelm Schallmayer on the 
significance of the theory of evolution for social and political issues as examples of this perspective of 
intervention. There are also other examples of the importance of an engineering approach in the social 
thinking of this time: in 1881 Julius Post published his contributions to „Social-Engineering“ (Arbeit 
statt Almosen. Beiträge zur Social-Technik; Labour rather than Charity. Contributions to Social-
Engineering). In 1899, Paul Natorp introduced the concept of social engineering in his 
Sozialpädagogik.Theorie der Willenserziehung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft (Social 
pedagogy. A theory of the cultivation of the will on the basis of community). In 1904, Albert Kellner 
presented the Gesellschaft für Ethische Kultur (Society for Ethical Culture), his Social-Engineer (Der 
Sozial-Ingenieur) and reports about different approaches to enhancing working conditions in the 
United States and in Great Britain (see Neef 2012, pp. 257‒259). 
8 This part of Dilthey’s philosophy was and still is neglected. An exception, on which I base my own 
interpretation, are the works of Matthias Jung (see Jung 1996; 2003; 2008). 
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Wherever psychic inwardness emerges, namely, in the entire animal and human world, the 
structure and articulation of life is the same. But what is still completely lacking in the lower 
forms of life is that manifold of discrete sensations and feelings on which psychology as a rule 
is built. The primordial nucleus of inner life is always and everywhere the progression from an 
impression stemming from the milieu of the living creature to the movement that adapts the 
relationship of the milieu of the living creature. There is no more original connection than this 
in all inner life. […] Seen from inside, the development of the living creature into higher forms 
involves an articulation; life articulates itself. And to the inner articulation there corresponds an 
external articulation of the animate, organic body in a series of stages. Intermediaries between 
the impression and the executed movement multiply. Both the initial impressions and the final 
response assume more complex forms. But everything happens on the basis of a schema 
common to animal and human life. And precisely in this great, encompassing nexus and its 
relation to our intellectual inner life there lies the convincing, unimpeachable proof that thought 
appears as part of life, is linked to it, and serves its sphere. A biological perspective is 
necessary in order to be convincing about the structure of life. (Dilthey 2010b, pp. 70-71) 
This glance at Dilthey’s hermeneutics of life shows that he was attempting to integrate 
biological concepts into his theory of mind without deducing the latter from a biological basis. 
In this respect, his philosophy is an example of the comprehensive claims of the discourses 
on life around 1900. Moreover, Dilthey’s theoretical considerations on human nature always 
have a practical slant. The “practical nature of human beings” (Dilthey 2010b, p. 14) is the 
starting point of his epistemology. Therefore Dilthey developed an anthropology of 
knowledge in which the nexus of life and value plays a crucial role. He claims that the main 
work of life is to recognize what is really valuable for us (see Dilthey 2004, p. 88). Even 
knowledge of reality serves to elaborate life-values. It is this aim which gives human actions 
their teleological aspect. Moreover, Dilthey wanted to integrate humanity into the 
purposiveness of nature, and defined the individual as the reference point of purposiveness. 
Dilthey envisaged the human life-unit as a subject of self-preservation. The “course of a life” 
is defined as a “unity”, which constitutes a “complete and self-enclosed, clearly delineated 
process” (Dilthey 2002, pp. 92-93). The lived experiences “belong to a nexus that persists as 
permanent amidst all sorts of changes throughout the entire course of life” (ibid. p. 102). On 
the level of culture, the continual process of individuation is exactly this ‘permanent 
persistence’9 of a single nexus in the course of life. The process of individuation has a 
biological foundation: Dilthey conceives individuation as a descendant of the self-
preservation instinct. He thinks that the human life-unit is ultimately nothing but “a bundle of 
drives” (Dilthey 2010a, p. 14). And life-experience, in which the value of things is proved, can 
                                               
9 Manfred Sommer notes correctly that this phrase is an „emphatic pleonasm“ (see Sommer 1984, p. 
61). But his judgment that Dilthey’s life-unit is isolated in itself is false. For Dilthey the life-unit is always 
exposed to “the pressure of the outside world“ (Dilthey 2010a, p. 25). This difference is „first 
experienced in impulse and resistance“ (ibid. p. 23) and develops into social interaction.   
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be seen as an enhancement of self-identity by reflective awareness (see Dilthey 1990b, p. 
409). This process also enables the objectification of life values. Its highest form is 
philosophy, which develops a system of values and analyses their genesis and validity – a 
process from which non-human life-forms are nevertheless excluded by definition. 
It is important to acknowledge that it is not just the philosophical discourse on life that is 
characterised by the practical turn, which entangles the concept of life with the concept of 
value. As Gehring emphasises: 
The oscillating concept of ‘life-value’ is a hinge of the discourse on life. Life is value and life – as 
valuating authority – signalises likewise what really has value […]. On the one hand ‘life-value’ 
is (almost) a pleonasm, but on the other hand the certainty of the ‘value’ of life constitutes what 
turns the mere discourse on life into a dispositif, in other words an effective guideline also for 
institutional actions outside science. 10 (Gehring 2009, p. 134; translated by J.S.)  
 Gehring convincingly argues that this action-theoretical and existential concept of reality 
emerged with this all-inclusive concept of life. The idea is that reality should be reshaped in 
the name of life and values (see Gehring 2009, p. 132). Already Friedrich Nietzsche refers in 
his Untimely Mediations to the “master builder of the future” (“Baumeister der Zukunft”, 
Nietzsche 1874, p. 294; translated by J.S.), who shapes a new future by the power of their 
will. In a posthumous fragment Nietzsche also uses the phrase “master builder of life” 
(“Baumeister des Lebens”, Nietzsche 1980a, p. 631; translated by J.S.). But Nietzsche points 
above all to a problem in the axiological concept of life. His vitalistic theory of history 
emphasises the destructive features of innovation. For Nietzsche, the creation of something 
new always presupposes the destruction of the established. Precisely in this sense, he 
conceives of history as life. For Nietzsche, “life always lives at the expense of other lives”11 
(Nietzsche 1980b, p. 167; translated by J.S.) since “in its basic functions” life “essentially […] 
harms, oppresses, exploits, and destroys, and cannot be conceived at all without this 
character.”12 (Nietzsche 1887, p. 312; translated by J.S.) It is exactly this essential 
connection between the preservation and destruction of life which is an argument against a 
cybernetic starting point for justifying an ethical dimension of the concept of life (see Toepfer 
                                               
10 See the German original: “Ein Gelenkstück des Lebensdiskurses ist der in sich changierende Begriff 
‘Lebenswert’. Leben ist Wert und Leben zeichnet zugleich – als wertende Instanz – ‘das wirklich’ 
Wertvolle aus […]. Einerseits ist ‘Lebenswert’ (fast) ein Pleonasmus, andererseits liegt in jener 
Gewissheit vom ‘Wert’ des Lebens das, was aus dem bloßen Diskurs des Lebens ein Dispositiv 
macht, also eine praxiswirksamen Leitstrahl auch für außerwissenschaftliches instituionelles Handeln.” 
(Gehring 2009, p. 134)  
11 See the German original: “Leben lebt immer auf Unkosten andern Lebens”. (Nietzsche 1980b, p. 
167) 
12 See the whole sentence in the German original: “An sich von Recht und Unrecht reden entbehrt 
alles Sinns, an sich kann natürlich ein Verletzen, Vergewaltigen, Ausbeuten, Vernichten nichts 
‘Unrechtes’ sein, insofern das Leben essentiell, nämlich in seinen Grundfunktionen verletzend, 
vergewaltigend, ausbeutend, vernichtend fungirt und gar nicht gedacht werden kann ohne diesen 
Charakter.” (Nietzsche 1887, p. 312) 
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2011, pp. 457-458, Toepfer 2014). This argument holds in the realm of biology, because 
Nietzsche’s view is proven by biological observation. 
 
4 Life again? Conclusions  
This short examination of an important part of the history of the concept of life suggests a 
surprising result. In the light of this history, synthetic biology leads to well-known debates, 
arguments, notions and questions – especially in the philosophical and ethical discourse on 
this new approach in biological research and technology. The concept of “life as a toolbox”, 
which was shaped by the interpretation of the research activity of synthetic biology, has 
already been formulated in another context. It does not add “a new facet to the multifarious 
concept ‘life’” as Deplazes-Zemp claims (2012, p. 772). There is a long tradition of discussing 
and answering the questions about life which synthetic biology raises. Therefore, the 
questions themselves have to be analysed critically. Do they capture the epistemological, 
ontological and ethical consequences of synthetic biology? And does the concept of life 
provide solutions to actual problems, or at least help to understand this new approach in 
biology, together with its societal impact? To answer these questions I return to the current 
issues:  
(1) Our discussion of the current issues has shown that the phrase “fabrication of life” 
encapsulates many of the hopes and concerns connected with synthetic biology. Emphasis 
on this notion's historical roots permits a more sober judgement on synthetic biology and the 
expectations which are connected with this new technology.  
(2) But should synthetic biological systems be defined as living? In my opinion, the 
concept of life is too ambiguous and controversial to be useful for capturing the actual 
practice of synthetic biology. Therefore, synthetic biology should follow other branches of 
biology in being reluctant to use the term. This would be helpful for both synthetic biology 
itself, and philosophical debates about it. Yet, from another angle, it is to be welcomed that 
because of this new constructive approach in biology, established dualisms such as that of 
nature and technology are being questioned again. In these debates, the concept of life 
could play a crucial role since, because of its ambiguity – especially its “double meaning as a 
material object […] and as a value of certain spiritual or even moral dimensions” (Budisa 
2012, p. 101) – the concept of life could mediate between heterogeneous spheres like the 
natural sciences and the humanities, theory and practice, descriptive contexts and normative 
contexts. Following this view, synthetic biology could be considered as the latest example of 
the entanglement of theory and practice in modern science. It presents an essential feature 
of the life sciences, because they are characterized by their close relation to practical 
application. Moreover, their significance is based on their practical impact, which already 
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shapes our daily life. Thus, for a critical understanding of the life sciences it is all the more 
important to consider scientific research as a social practice. The concept of life could 
indicate this entanglement of science and society. Furthermore, it emphasises the existential 
dimension of every cultural practice.  
(3) History tells us that the concept of life is strongly associated with the concept of value. 
There are various versions of the equation “life is value”. Nevertheless there are strong 
arguments against its ethical relevance, especially in the context of synthetic biology.13 First, 
both concepts (life and value) are highly ambiguous and problematic. It would need careful 
elaboration to establish an ethics of life which is based on the intrinsic value of life. Second, 
in the history of the concept of life there have been arguments for and against its ethical 
relevance. Careful examination of the history of ethics would reveal that it is highly 
controversial whether life as such has an intrinsic value. Generally, life is regarded only as a 
prerequisite for the realization of ethically valuable qualities (see Toepfer 2014). Moreover, 
the historical findings clearly show that, for example, the cybernetic version of an ethics of life 
is not tenable. Third, the question remains, what counts as life? To use life as an ethical 
concept presupposes a precise and generally valid definition of life, which is not available so 
far – whether in biology or in philosophy.  
But perhaps this fact does not matter because whether the objects of synthetic biology are 
conceived as living beings or not isn’t important for the ethical dimension of synthetic biology. 
Synthetic biology is definitely a further step in the mastery of nature; in others words, in its 
cultivation. It could even lead to “a parallel biological world” (Budisa 2012 p. 115). It is no 
accident that Budisa compares the route to such a world with “a road that follows a course 
that has to be optimally designed” (ibid). This “directed evolution” (ibid.) is distinguished from 
“natural evolution” which is described as “a contingent historical process, like the flow of the 
river” (ibid). This metaphor clearly presents synthetic biology as cultivating natural evolution. 
Not least because of this radical possibility, synthetic biology has to be seen as a new 
technology which raises old philosophical questions: Which attitude towards nature is 
reasonable? Is the “human intellect” (ibid.) a good “directing principle” (ibid.) for natural 
processes? How far should we change the face of the world? Can we take the responsibility 
for the consequences of such deep interventions, especially if we think of future generations? 
What can we know about the potential consequences? In the context of such questions, the 
special ethical challenge of synthetic biology becomes apparent. As several authors 
convincingly argue, its risks are not captured by traditional technology assessment (e.g., 
Engelhard 2011). Complex biological systems are difficult to predict (see, e.g., Köchy 2012a, 
pp. 172-173). The more they diverge from nature, the less models for comparison are 
                                               
13 See also Eichinger, this volume.  
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available. Therefore, in my opinion, the questions of biosafety and biosecurity are urgent. For 
a valid technology assessment it is certainly important to know, as concretely as possible, 
how synthetic biological systems behave. But the question whether this activity has to be 
conceived as life or not is a philosophical one. And in this context, Hegel’s famous claim that 
“the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk” is probably true:  
When philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be 
rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy. (Hegel 2003, p. 23) 
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